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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No. 920484-CA

v.

:

WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for issuing a bad
check, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-505 (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and
for Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ray M. Harding,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove that

defendant issued a check knowing that it would not be paid?

"In

considering [whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
jury's verdict, the appellate court] review[s] the evidence and
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.

[The appellate court]

reversefs] a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained

a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444

(Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
2.

Does the bad check statute, which makes criminal

the issuance of a bad check "paying for any services, wages,
salary, [or] labor" embrace the payment for concrete?
"Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.

Utah

appellate courts review questions of law under a correction of
error standard, without deference to the trial court."

State v.

Baqshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Utah App. 1990) (citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. (1990)
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft - Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor,
or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check
or draft for which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed
to know the check or draft would not be paid if he had no account
with the drawee at the time of issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the
payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor,
or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally refused by
the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual
notice of the check or draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be
punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts
made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six
2

months amounts to a sum of not more than $200, such offense shall
be a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to
a sum exceeding $200 but not more than $300, such offense shall
be a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to
a sum exceeding $300 but not more than $1,000, such offense shall
be a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn
in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to
a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense shall be a second degree
felony.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, William Christensen, was charged by
information with the offense of issuing a bad check in an amount
exceeding $2,000.00, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990) (R. 1). Following a jury trial,
defendant was convicted and sentenced to a term of one to fifteen
years.

The sentence was suspended upon defendant's successful

completion of a thirty-six month probation.

Defendant was also

ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $2,229.74 to the
victim (R. 82).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June, 1991 defendant was engaged in the construction
of a cabin in the area of Fairview, Sanpete County (R. 93-94,
121).

On July 1, 1991, defendant and Stephen Ludlow, owner of

Nephi Lumber ("Nephi"), entered into an agreement in which Nephi
would provide defendant with concrete for the construction of the
cabin (R. 94). Because Nephi could not obtain sufficient
information on which to offer defendant credit, the parties
agreed that delivery of concrete would be only on a cash basis
3

(R. 94, 127).
On July 5, 1991, Nephi delivered four truckloads of
concrete to the jobsite, a distance of forty miles from Nephi's
plant, requiring a travel time of one and one-quarter to one and
one half hours (R. 95, 122). Defendant did not pay for the
concrete, stating that he did not have his checkbook with him (R.
95).

On July 9, defendant called to cancel delivery of more

concrete, but was too late to prevent the dispatch of one truck,
which poured its load upon arrival at the jobsite (R. 123, 9596).

Defendant also did not pay for this delivery, knowing that

he did not have the cash to pay for it (R. 96, 123, 127). Ludlow
testified that Nephi would no longer do business with defendant
until payment was received (R. 97, 101).
On September 7, 1991, Nephi received a check from
defendant in the amount of $2229 in full payment of his account
(R. 97, 129). Following deposit, the check was returned to Nephi
indicating that there were insufficient funds to cover it (R. 9798).

Defendant's bank statement indicated that there had not

been more than $817.38 in the account at any time since July 1,
and that on September 5, 1991, there was only $45.76 in the
account (State's Ex. 3, copied at R. 23, 106). As of trial
defendant had not paid the debt to Nephi (R. 98, 131).
Defendant testified that he would have been able to pay
for the concrete from proceeds from the job, but that he was not
paid (R. 124). He also claimed to have been expecting a direct
transfer of enough funds to his account to cover his debt to
4

Nephi, which he intended to pay, from an investor in his mining
operation (R. 126-127).

However, the investor, whose name

defendant, in contempt of court, refused to disclose, did not
come through, and the funds were never deposited (R. 126, 130).
Defendant also acknowledged that at the time he wrote the check
he knew that he did not have sufficient funds to cover it (R.
127, 129).
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved to
dismiss on the ground that his check was not issued to induce
Nephi to part with any money or property or other thing of value,
nor to pay for any service, wages, salary, labor or rent (R.
112).

The prosecution argued that the sale of concrete was

different from the sale of other items in that it was perishable,
and that the delivery of concrete constituted a service under the
bad check statute (R. 113). Ruling that the evidence indicated
that concrete was unique in requiring special services for its
delivery, the trial court found those services to be within the
purview of the act and denied defendant's motion (115-16).l
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Under section 76-6-505 culpable intent consists only in
knowing a check will not be paid.

In this case there was

evidence to show that defendant knew that his account did not
have sufficient funds to cover the $2229 check, that defendant's

1

The colloquy and ruling pertaining to defendant's motion
to dismiss is attached at Addendum A.
5

account had not held more than $817.38 for at least two months
prior to the issuance of the check and that as of the date of
trial the debt still had not been paid, all of which was
sufficient to prove that defendant possessed a culpable state of
mind.
POINT II
The legislative policy behind the bad check statute is
to make criminal the intentional impeding of commercial
transactions brought about by the passing of bad checks.

In this

case the legislative policy should be broadly construed to find
that the provision of concrete was within the statute making
criminal the "paying for services, wages, salary [or] labor"
through the issuance of a bad check.

There was evidence to show

that like such "services, wages, salary [or] labor," the
provision of concrete was a unique service whose performance was,
in the ordinary course of business contemplated by the statute,
necessarily tendered before the payment of money and which could
not be withdrawn as might the provision of other products.
Given defendant's undisputable culpable state of mind
in passing the bad check, and given the clear intent of the
legislature in enacting the bad check statute, defendant's
conduct should be found criminal within the terms of the statute.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT POSSESSED A CULPABLE STATE OF MIND
UNDER THE BAD CHECK STATUTE BY KNOWINGLY
ISSUING A CHECK WHICH HE KNEW THE BANK WOULD
NOT PAY,
Defendant arguesf in effect, that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that he acted with intent to
defraud in writing the bad check because he believed that there
would be funds to cover it from an anonymous mining investor
(Appellant's Brief at Point II).
At the outset, defendant misapprehends the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990), in arguing that he did not
have an "intent to defraud" Nephi.

The phrase, "intent to

defraud," refers to the intention not to pay in an action for
fraud or deceit, 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit

§§ 36, 185, 188

(1968), and was the operative phrase in the predecessor statute
to section 76-6-505.2

In State v. Delmotte, 665 P. 2d 1314 (Utah

2

Prior to the revision of the entire criminal code in
1973, the issuance of bad checks was made criminal under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953), which provided, in pertinent part:
Any person who . . . wilfully, with
intent to defraud, makes . . . or delivers
any check . . . upon any bank . . . for the
payment of money, knowing at the time of such
making . . . or delivering that the maker
. . . has not sufficient funds in . . . said
bank . . . for the payment of such checks
[sic] . . ., in full upon its presentation,
although no express representation is made
with reference thereto, is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year, or in the state prison for not
more than 14 years.
7

1983), the court noted such intent was no longer required under
the present bad check statute:
Defendant's final contention is that the
court erred in failing to instruct that
intent to defraud is a necessary element of a
bad check charge. This claim of error is
without merit, since the offense calls for no
such element. Defendant argues that when the
statutory language was changed in 1977, the
legislature intended to retain the element as
part of the offense. The omission of the
element in the revised statute logically can
mean nothing but that the legislature's
purpose deliberately was to remove such
intent as an element of the offense. The
element of 'knowledge' of the overdraft is
now sufficient to support a conviction.
Id. at 1315.

See State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1983)

(Hall, C.J., dissenting and distinguishing section 76-6-505 from
its predecessor, noting that the "gravemen of the offense is the
issuance of a check 'knowing it will not be paid,'" citing
Delmotte); State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (Utah App.
1989) (citing Delmotte with approval for the proposition that
"[i]ntent to defraud is not a necessary element of the bad check
offense under section 76-6-505 as now written").
When challenging the jury's verdict, the defendant must
show that the evidence and its inferences are so "inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted."
(Utah 1983),

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444

M

[S]o long as some evidence and reasonable

The making . . . of such check . . . as
aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of
intent to defraud. [Emphasis added.]
8

inferences support the jury's findings, [the appellate court]
will not disturb them."

See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345

(Utah 1985) .
In State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985), a
prosecution under section 76-6-505, the court found the jury was
under no obligation to believe the defendant lacked knowledge of
the insufficiency of her bank account, despite her
possibly not having received bank statements for the two months
preceding her writing bad checks.

See also State v. Coffey, 564

P.2d 777 (Utah 1977) (sufficient evidence to prove that the
defendant issued a bad check knowing it would not be paid where
no deposits had been made to cover check and that for almost a
month afterward there were still insufficient funds in the
account).
In thi: case defendant admitted that, notwithstanding
his expectation that funds would be deposited to his account, he
knew he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the
check written to Nephi (R. 127, 129). Defendant's checking
account contained only $45.76 two days before the issuance of the
check, and never had more than $817.38 from July 1, 1991 (State's
Ex. 3, copied at R. 23, 106). Defendant claimed that he expected
funds to be directly deposited to his account from a prospective
investor, but he refused to disclose the name of the investor (R.
129-130), clearly undercutting the ground of his defense on the
question of intent.

9

Furthermore, assuming the other requirements of the
statute are met, section 76-6-505 effectively creates an
irrebuttable presumption of guilt if a person making a bad check
"fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount
of the refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving
actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment."
Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (1990).

Utah Code

The jury was instructed on this

requirement under the statute (Jury Instruction #2, R. 51).
Ludlow testified that after the check was returned, he
warned defendant that if it were not paid he would turn the
matter over to the police, which he did on October 17 (R. 97-98).
The evidence was undisputed that the check had not been paid as
of the date of trial, June 4, 1992. Thus, more than 14 days
passed following defendant's actual notice that the check had not
been paid, during which time the debt remained unpaid.
In sum, the evidence was not so inconclusive or
improbable that the jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the offense charged.
POINT II
THE POLICY BEHIND SECTION 76-6-505, TO PUNISH
A CRIMINAL INTENT TO IMPEDE THE FLOW OF
COMMERCE THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF BAD CHECKS,
REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT BE FOUND
CRIMINAL.
A.

Criminal Culpability is Not
Precluded in this Case in Spite
of the Bad Check's Being Given
to Satisfy an Antecedent Debt.
Defendant argues that because the check was given to

satisfy a past due account it could not have induced the delivery
10

of the concrete, and is therefore not actionable under section
76-6-505, citing State v. Green, in support (Appellant's Brief at
Point III).
The State concedes that if defendant's conduct is
subject only to that portion of the statute that makes criminal
the passing of a bad check "for the purpose of obtaining from any
. . . firm, partnership or corporation, any money, property, or
other thing of value . . •," then his passing of a bad check is
not a criminal act:
Where the worthless check statute
requires that the cr^ender obtain money or
property before the .rime is complete, it is
essential that the party whose money or
property is obtained believed that the check
was good and that it would paid, and that in
thus relying on the check such party was
induced to transfer the money or property for
the check.
32 AM. JUR. 2D False

Pretenses

§ 81 (1982).

Accord People v.

Miller, 286 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968); State v.
Campbell, 543 P.2d 1171, 1172 (Id. 1975).
This general principle is apparently the op... ative law
in Utah.

See Green, 672 P.2d at 401 (holding that where the

victim was not induced by a bad check to part with "any money,
property or thing of value . . ., [a]n essential element of the
crime was missing").
Contrariwise,
where the statute is drawn so that it is not
essential that money or property be obtained,
it would appear that the offense may be
committed even though the payee takes the
check in payment of a pre-existing debt, and
11

is therefore not relying on the worthless
check to his disadvantage or detriment.
32 AM. JUR. 2D False

Pretenses

§ 81 (1982).

Section 76-6-505 contains an alternative provision,
making criminal through the issuance of a bad check the "paying
for any services, wages, salary [or] labor . . . ."

This portion

of the statute does not require that the "thing of value" be
obtained because of the contemporaneous tender of the bad check,
but rather in that class of situations in which performance is
naturally tendered long before payment is offered.

Accord Bailey

v. State, 408 P.2d 244, 244 (Wyo. 1965) (finding actionable the
issuance of a bad check to pay a past-due indebtedness where the
statute made criminal not only the obtaining of money,
merchandise, property or other thing of value through fraud, but
also "the payment of any obligation" with knowledge of
insufficient funds).

Thus, section 76-6-505 does not preclude

guilt in all cases in which a bad check is given in satisfaction
of an antecedent debt.
B.

The Legislative Policy Behind the
Bad Check Statute/ to Make Criminal
the Intent to Wrongfully Impede the
Flow of Commercef Should Govern
Review in this Case.
Defendant particularly argues that the delivery of

concrete is not a "service" under section 76-6-505 (Appellant's
Brief at Point I).
"Statutory terms should be interpreted and applied
according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary

12

meaning of the term results in an application that is . . . 'in
blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'. .
'[I]f there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or
application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to
analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective/ and
to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and
purpose.'"

State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added) (holding that where the
offense of "furnishing or supplying" alcohol to a minor did not,
on its face, explicate the degree of control the offender was
required to exercise in providing alcohol, it was, in part,
appropriate to consider the protective policy behind the statute
to protect minors).
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed
"according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice
and to effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of
Section 76-1-104." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990).

In State

v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), the court broadly
construed the criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-518 (1990), to include baseball mitts within its terms in
the face of the defendant's claim that the statute failed to
specify the type of goods in question and that similar criminal
simulation statutes had been interpreted narrowly as covering
only unique chattels, such as antiques or paintings.

Quoting

from a similar case in New York, the court rejected the
defendant's argument, adopting the Model Penal Code's view that
13

its fraudulent simulation section embraced objects other than
unique chattels.

Id. at 192.

In State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169

(Utah 1989), the court considered whether the receiving stolen
property statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), embraced
property that was not actually stolen.

Relying on the Model

Penal Code (as well as other authorities), the court determined
that property received by an accused need not be stolen in order
to criminalize otherwise culpable conduct. JTd. at 1170-1173.
The manner in which the court developed the rationale for its
decision, whereby conceivably non-culpable conduct was found to
be within the
statute's purview, is instructive in this case:
Modern criminal jurisprudence has a very
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent
instead of simply punishing the manifest
criminality or outwardly criminal act. Our
Legislature has expressed that its concern is
directed more toward subjective criminality
than toward manifest criminality by stating
in [Utah Code Ann.] § 76-1-104(2) [(1953, as
amended)]:
The Provisions of this code shall be
construed in accordance with these general
purposes.
. . . .

(2) Define adequately the conduct and
mental state which constitute each offense

and safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as
criminal.
. . . .

(Emphasis added.) Section 76-2-101 expresses
the same legislative purpose:
No person is guilty of an offense unless
his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence with
respect to each element of the offense as the
definition of the offense requires;
14

•

• •

See State v. Elton, Utah, 680 P.2d 727
(1984). Sections 76-1-104 and 76-2-101
demonstrate a legislative desire not to
punish manifestly criminal acts that are not
a::~mpanied by a subjective mental state to
do ,*rong. The converse is also true. We see
th' legislaturefs desire to punish subjective
jc: .nalitv so long as it is linked with some
91
~wise harmless corroborative act that
d€
strates the firmness of the actor's
ci ~nal resolve. Examples of this are [Urah
Cc
Ann.] § 76-4-101(3)(b) [(1953, as
ar ded)], which denies an impossibility
de nse to an attempt charge, and [Utah Code
An ] § 76-2-304(1) [(1953, as amended)],
wh. ft states that a mistake of fact is a
defense only if it disproves the culpable
mental state. Likewise, in the theft by
receiving statute the Legislature expressed
its desire to prohibit subjective criminality
(the culpable mental state of desiring to
receive stolen property) when it is
accompanied by an otherwise harmless act
(receiving property that is not actually
stolen). The interpretation that the subject
property need not be stolen and that the
focus is on the actor's mental state is in
harmony with the modern trend of criminal
jurisprudence. See generally
G. Fletcher,
Rethinking
Criminal Law ch. 3 (1978).
Id. at 1172 (emphasis added).
In State v. Bruce, 1 Utah 2d 136, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah
1953), the court found that although prior case law and the
majority view held the passing of a postdated, insufficient funds
check would not support a charge of fraud, where evidence
nonetheless showed an intent to defraud (required under the
former bad check statute, section 76-20-11), the case should go
to the jury.

The court bolstered its opinion by citing the

purpose for which the statute was enacted, i.e., the elimination
of the annoyance of bad check transactions which "disarrange[]
15

and retarcl[] the business affairs of every person and institution
through whose hands such [] check[s] pass[] . . . .

This purpose

should not be defeated by an interpretation of the statute which
would permit one bent upon fraud to protect himself . . . ." 1
Utah 2d at 140, 262 P.2d at 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).

See also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 224.5 comment

at 315-16 (Official Draft 1985) (noting the adverse impact on
ordinary commerce resulting from the passing of bad checks even
where fraudulent purpose is absent).
Section 76-6-505 clearly distinguishes "paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor or rent" from "payment . . . for
the purpose of obtaining . . . money, property or anthing of
value."

The apparent reason for this distinction is the former

class, in the ordinary course of business, are paid for only
after the cheated party has tendered his consideration and,
naturally, cannot be withheld if payment is not contemporaneously
forthcoming.

In this respect the provision of concrete, which in

most contexts would simply be regarded as a product, is most like
service, wage, salary, labor or rent.

Ludlow testified that once

the concrete was on its way to a destination as distant as
defendant's jobsite, it could not be returned under any
circumstance and still retain its value (R. 96-97).
Additionally, Ludlow stated that imbedded in the cost of concrete
were the wages and labor of his employees (R. 100-01).
In this case defendant indisputedly knew that he did
not have sufficient funds to cover the check he had issued to
16

Nephi.

The purpose of the statute is to make criminal the

passing of bad checks which impede the flow of commerce.
Furthermore, the statute reaches a certain class of items, whose
common feature is that they cannot be withheld by the provider
once they are tendered, a condition which pertains in this case,
regardless of when the check is passed.

For all of these reasons

this Court should find that defendant's issuance of a bad check
in this case is within the purview of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and his
yrr

conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

think that our argument is and we would move the Court
to dismiss the case at this time based on the evidence
that's been presented because it is our feeling that
the State has not met the requirement of the statute,
and that is that the statute says if the check
THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:

Which section

—

—

I'm referring to Section

76-6-505.
THE COURT:

Give me one second.

MR. HARMON:

It's on page 110.

THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:

Okay.
What we're saying is that

there's no question that the check was not issued to
cause Nephi Lumber to part with any money or property
or other thing of value.
with.

That had already been parted

And I think that the statute as to those things

would say if the charge is good, then the check must
have been the inducement to cause the parting of those
items.
I'm not sure how that applies with the other
things, but it says, "if the check is issued for the
paying of any service, wages, salary, labor, or rent."
And in this case there's no question that the check
was not issued for any of those things.

It was issued

for an open account that arose by reason of the sale

of concrete.

And concrete is a product and doesn't

fall within any of the prescriptions provided by the
statute.

So I think that it's clear that

Mr. Christensen has issued a check to pay an
outstanding account.

The account was several months

old by the time the check was issued; and, therefore,
the criminal charge should be dismissed.
Clearly, he owes the debt and there are other
provisions in the Code on how that can be collected.
But I don't think the criminal process is the
appropriate proceeding at the present time, and we
would ask that the case be dismissed.
MR. EYRE:

Your Honor, as you've determined

from the testimony, the sale of concrete is different
from the sale of other items.
perishable item.

It's clearly a

The practice in the industry is if

it's going to be a cash sale, that the payment is made
upon delivery of the concrete.
I think this is very much similar to the
other things that are talked about there, services,
wages, labor, or rent.

Those are items that payment

is made after the service is rendered, the rent is
incurred.

It talks about services there.

This is the

service of delivery of concrete, and the payment is
received thereafter.

Mr. Ludlow has clearly testified that he
would not have delivered the concrete on a credit
basis.

It was clearly on the basis that he was going

to be paid cash or check in lieu of cash.
I think that it falls within the language of
the statute, the prima facie case that's been
submitted based upon the State's case in chief.
If the Court finds not, I think that the Code
of Criminal Procedure clearly permits that if one
crime has not been committed based upon the evidence
but that clearly another crime has, and that being
theft by deception, then the Court is in a position to
amend the Information to charge the alternate offense
of theft by deception.
Clearly, Mr. Christensen if he didn't issue a
bad check for the payment of services, he induce the
delivery of the concrete, the permanent deprivation of
that property of Mr. Ludlow's, by deception, by
misrepresentation.
But I still feel that based upon the language
of the statute, that the evidence that has been
submitted comes within the realm of that statute.

And

the State has made a prima facie case, and the case
should go forward.
MR. HARMON:

I just have one short comment,

Vonda K. Bassett, CSR

(801) 429-1080

your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:

Go ahead.
I think that the concern we have

here is that Mr. Ludlow was clearly well-trained in
his business.
concrete.

He knows what the situation is with

And I think that he knew that as soon as he

loaded those trucks in Nephi and headed them down the
road to Sanpete County that if he was not going to
receive payment, he in effect had extended credit.
The only alternative he's telling us that he
has is when he gets there if there's no payment to be
received, he can just waste his concrete.
In this case he delivered one load, and then
several days later he delivers another load.
never has been paid for these.

And he

I think if this were a

true inducement, if the check had been delivered prior
to the loads going over or at the time it was received
by them, then I think we have a case.

But here the

check was never involved in any of that.
THE COURT:

The problem —

and I agree if

we're talking totally about a product, but I think
that there is more than the purchase or promise of
payment or purchase for a product.
And I agree with Mr. Eyre that concrete has
some unique qualities in the aspect that it requires
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special equipment for delivery and special handling by
people for delivery, and literally for its delivery
not only to a project site, but to the specific area
where it's going to be used and formed.

There is a

definite service provided in connection with that.
The service not only being driving a truck over, but
then discharging the product from the truck into forms
provided by the contractor on the site.

And that's an

additional service that comes with it.
It isn't like going to the lumber yard and
picking up a load of 2 X 4's that
delivered or pick up yourself.

you can either have

You don't go pick up a

load of concrete in the back of your truck.

It

requires those additional items of service.

And I

think those services are within the intent of the
legislature, and the Court would so order.

Anything

else on that?
MR. HARMON:
THE COURT:

That's all we have, your Honor.
Very well, then.

The motion will

be denied.
And if you'll bring the jury back.
(The proceedings were resumed in open court
in the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:

Well, it looks like the sheriff

was successful in finding all of you.

That's good.

